
SETTING UP ROADBLOCKS – SWITCHING OFF THE LIGHTS
In the 1MDB and associated cases against Datuk Seri Najib Razak (DS Najib), the Malaysian courts applied their Evidence Act exceptions, special MACC/AMLA provisions, and a “maximum evaluation” of the totality of evidence (including the money trail) in the slew of cases against DS Najib Razak. However, the challenges below test whether those rulings would sit comfortably under stricter or more cautionary approaches common elsewhere, particularly where reliability, fairness, and the ability to test evidence are emphasized.
HEARSAY ADMISSION
(statements attributed to Jho Low, Nik Faisal, Terence Geh, Azlin Alias and similar unavailable persons)
Malaysian courts admitted relevant communications under Evidence Act s 32(1)(b) (ordinary course of business) and specific MACC Act s 41A / AMLA provisions, treating them as falling within statutory exceptions and resting the core case on the independent fund-tracing.
A comparative challenge would stress the safeguards in the UK’s Criminal Justice Act 2003. Section 116 (unavailable witnesses) requires the maker to be identified to the court’s satisfaction and to fall into defined categories (dead, unfit, outside the jurisdiction and not reasonably practicable to secure, cannot be found after reasonable steps, or fear).
‘The party must show reasonable efforts to secure attendance. Section 117 (business documents) requires the supplier to have personal knowledge of the information and applies additional caution for multiple hearsay; the court may exclude it if reliability is doubtful. The residual “interests of justice” gateway in s 114(1)(d) explicitly requires the court to weigh probative value against the difficulty of challenging the statement and the prejudice to the opposing party’.
It would be worth noting that Jho Low had a lawyer representing his interests that the court had knowledge of; the court could have made an order for substituted service to attend as a witness on the recalcitrant, absconding Jho Low’s and served it on his lawyers. They did not. Under those standards, the absence of demonstrated rigorous efforts to locate or secure Jho Low and the other named individuals, combined with the multiple layers through which their alleged instructions reached the court, should have compelled closer scrutiny.
The Indian Evidence Act s 32 similarly limits statements of persons who cannot be found, but courts traditionally require the conditions to be strictly proved. The devil’s-advocate point is that admitting such statements with relatively light proof of unavailability and limited ability for the defence to test the primary source risks converting secondary accounts into primary proof of knowledge and direction, precisely the mischief the hearsay rule targets.

A Politician in Judicial robes?– Created more doubt than resolved issues– Alice in Wonderland
ERRORS IN ASSESSING THE AUTHENTICITY OF DOCUMENTS
(particularly the Arab donation letters)
The courts treated the letters as of ‘questionable origin’ or ‘forgeries’, relying heavily on Jasmine Loo’s testimony that she witnessed the preparation of one letter by a Jho Low associate in 2015 (and that it was backdated). This, in spite of the absence of originals or independent Saudi confirmation, and the overall implausibility against the money trail, was allowed to prevail.
‘Comparative authenticity rules emphasize in the Commonwealth primary evidence and proof by the tendering party. The best-evidence principle (still residual in many Commonwealth systems) prefers the original; secondary evidence or inferences drawn from an interested, tainted witness as Jasmin Loo is, require careful justification.’
‘Forensic examination of signatures, paper, or metadata is often expected where forgery is alleged. Loo’s account, while admissible if properly received, comes from a witness with admitted close ties to Jho Low and considerable personal financial benefits linked to the transactions.’
‘Under stricter approaches, that would trigger heightened scrutiny of whether her testimony alone, without independent forensic or third-party verification, sufficiently established forgery beyond reasonable doubt.’
The challenge is that the letters’ rejection rested more on narrative inconsistency and the absence of corroboration for the defence than on affirmative, independently tested proof that they were fabricated.
ADMITTED PARTICIPATION IN THE OFFENCE BY JASMINE LOO – A QUESTION OF CREDIBILITY OF A TAINTED WITNESS (and the treatment of Jho Low as proxy/agent)
Loo testified to handing documents to Jho Low at the door of Najib’s residence, receiving substantial sums of money and gifts, witnessing letter preparation, and acting on instructions she understood to reflect the then-Prime Minister’s wishes.
The courts accepted her evidence as consistent with the documentary record and found no motive for her (or others) “to frame a sitting Prime Minister”.
In India, an accomplice is competent under Evidence Act s 133, yet Illustration (b) to s 114 creates a long-standing rule of prudence that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars that independently connect the accused to the offence.
English and other Commonwealth practice applies a similar cautionary approach (see classic statements in R v Baskerville and later cases).
South African law maintains an explicit cautionary rule for accomplice evidence.
Loo’s admitted receipt of ‘large sums of money and gifts’ for her role in the document chain, and her status as a close associate of the alleged central actor place her squarely in the category that triggers that caution. But not according to the Malaysan judges or the Malaysian Bar.
NOT CHARGING JASMINE LOO – RELYING INSTEAD ON HER TAINTED SELF-SERVING EVIDENCE TO CONVICT NAJIB
“Inverted Procedure: The trial of the Knave of Hearts, accused of stealing the Queen’s tarts, runs completely backward. The King of Hearts acts as the judge, and the Queen demands “sentence first, verdict afterwards,“. A complete subversion of proper justice.- Alice in Wonderland.
The selective decision not to charge Loo (or others who executed transfers) while relying on her against Najib would, under UK guidance on assisting offenders (R v Hutchinson and the earlier Pipe practice), raise questions about whether the public interest in prosecuting participants had been adequately resolved before their evidence was used as a foundation.
The devil’s-advocate argument is that the courts treated corroboration by the money trail as sufficient without applying the heightened caution traditionally required for participants who stand to benefit from shifting blame.

“Country Bumpkin?”- A judge out of his depth–Unable to contain his biases– A Deer Caught in the Headlights
ABSENCE OF KEY PARTICIPANTS (Jho Low and others) WHILE FOCUSING SOLELY ON NAJIB
Jho Low remained a fugitive, not a fringe player; other named actors were not called or located. The prosecution’s theory treated Jho Low as the accused’s proxy or “mirror image,” with management acting on ‘instructions understood to come from Najib’. The admission of hearsay at its worst.
Derivative liability principles across the Commonwealth allow conviction of an accomplice or participant even if the principal is not prosecuted or is acquitted (see, for example, Australian Commonwealth Criminal Code provisions and similar formulations elsewhere). Selective prosecution is ordinarily within prosecutorial discretion. That discretion, however, must be applied fairly, not capriciously, unfairly or unjustly. That wasn’t the case in the prosecution of Najib.
The challenge lies in the combination of factors: heavy reliance on secondary accounts of Jho Low’s instructions and status, the non-prosecution of active participants such as Loo who had hands-on roles, and the inability of the defence to cross-examine the alleged central conduit.
FAIR TRIAL AND EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW– ‘BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT‘- THE CEAUSESCU STANDARD
Fair-trial and equality-before-the-law arguments in other Commonwealth jurisdictions have occasionally succeeded where the pattern of who is charged and who is used as a witness appears inconsistent with the evidence of relative involvement, particularly when the absent actor is the one alleged to have orchestrated the mechanics.
Without the primary actor available for testing, the inference that every instruction or benefit flowed from Najib rather than from independent action by Jho Low and the management layer rests more heavily on circumstantial reconstruction.
Under a more demanding application of the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard, that reconstruction would be tested against the possibility that the available participants acted for their own enrichment while using the Prime Minister’s office and name.
JUSTICE AS A PROCESS OVER JUSTICE AS AN OUTCOME- WEAKER STANDARDS TO FASHION A DESIRED OUTCOME
These points do not ignore the Malaysian courts’ findings that the money trail, account operations, Cabinet and shareholder records, and the accused’s own evidence and inconsistencies formed a coherent whole sufficient to meet the standard.
They illustrate how the same facts might be viewed if the hearsay exceptions were applied with the UK’s explicit reliability and prejudice balancing, if accomplice caution were more explicitly required in the Indian or classic Commonwealth style, and if the absence of the central alleged proxy and the selective use of participating witnesses were given greater weight in the fairness assessment.
The strength of any such challenge would ultimately depend on the precise statutory text and the appellate courts’ willingness to treat the concurrent findings as perverse, an exacting threshold that the Federal Court has already applied in the SRC proceedings.











